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A common situation in developing countries in the past two decades was a
shortage of educated manpower relative to the expressed needs of the economy.
Many development planners felt that this skilled manpower shortage was seriouslv
retarding the development process, and considerabl e resources were devoted to
tooling up the educational system to produce more graduates in the shortest possible
time.

In recent years, however, many less developed countries have suddenly and

apparently to their surprise found themselves with too many (relative to the ab
sorptive capacities of their economies) rather than too few workers with intermediate educational attainments .

Forecasts of impending surpluses of even univer-

sity graduates are becoming increasingl v frequent.

Despite this, the people con

tinue to demand education; by "demand for education", we shall mean the number of
persons who would like (or whose parents wish them) to be enrolled in school under
existing conditions and who are able to pay the direct schooling costs.
This paper has two purposes:

(1) To investigate how the demand for education

depends on the number of educated persons in the labor force and their allocation
between different labor markets, and (2) To explain the persistence of a strong demand for education under a number of alternative specificatio ns of the wurKiug!!; of
the labor market with respect to educated workers. 1
The plan of the paper is as follows.

We first review the available evidence

on private rates of return to investment in schooling in less developed countries anc
then formulate a model of the demand for education as a function of the expected
private return. We then construct four alternative models of labor market behavior
1

rn general, economists concerned with education have not made explicit the
linkage between the demand for education and the demand for educated people. A
notable exception is Blaug (1966).
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and derive demand for education schedules in these four models.

We shall see that

in three of the models, the private returns to education and hence the demand for
education would be expected to remain constant or even increase with the size of
the educated surplus.

These possibilities, taken together with other factors that

might cause the demand for education to be inelastic with respect to the supply,
may provide an economic explanation for the sustained high demand for education in
less developed countries despite educated unemployment and underemployment.
Before going on, it may be useful to remark on a feature of the models formu
lated in this paper which may seem unconventional to readers familiar with labor
markets in such advanced countries as the U.S.

In most accounts of labor.markets

in the developed countries, wages are regarded as adjusting rapidly in response to a
gap between supply and demand for labor and workers or employers as moving less
rapidly; hence, wage changes are taken to be the primary equilibrating force.

1

How

ever, when one turns to the less developed countries, there is a growing body of
evidence that wage rates in those countries adjust only slowly, not fast enough to
bring about equilibriUiu between labor markets, with unemployment as the consequence.
One school of thought
1ncludiag
points to institutional factors which affect the bulk of the labor force,~the wideWage stickiness may occur for either of two sets of reasons.

spread effects of minimum wage legislation, the impact of government wage scales
throughout the modern sector of the economy, and wage gains negotiated by labor
unions.

2

A second (and not necessarily competing) argument is that non-institutional

circumstances -- the reduction of hiring and training costs and gains in worker
1

A recent exception may be found in Hall (1972).

2
on these points, see Berg (1966), Reynolds (1969), Frank (1971), and
Johnson (1972).
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efficiency as wages are raised -- could cause a rural-urban wage differential and
consequent urban unemployment in equilibrium. 1

As a stylized version of wage

stickiness, a number of writers including Harris and Todaro (1970) and Bhagwati
and Srinivasan (1973) have constructed models in which wages are taken as given
and the number of workers in various labor markets adjusts in order to determine
an equilibrium in terms of expected (lifetime) earnings on the supply side of the
labor market.

The labor market models below are formulated in this spirit of

quantity rather than price adjustment.
1.

The Demand for Education and Private Returns
Education is desired by different groups for different reasons:

by private

individuals who for job-related or other reasons want their children educated;
by firms and governmental bodies who wish to employ educated persons; by policy
makers who feel that a well-educated populace is necessary for national development;
and by teachers who are employed by the school system.

The private demand by

families who would like their children educated up to a particular level is our cen
tral concern in this paper.

This demand is not expressed in textbook fashion wheret

the private demand for education is minifested through the political process as
citizens bring pressure to bear on government officials to increase the number of
schooling spaces, not only at the given level but at prerequisite levels as well.
The concerns of employers, development planners, and teachers in turn determine the
willingness of the educational planners to adjust the supply of educational oppor
tunities in response to the private demand and the speed of adjustment.
1
These circumstances are analyzed thoroughly in Stiglitz (1972 and 1973).

-4It appears that the primarv factor motivati ng citizens to demand educatio n is
not the economic or social developm ent of the society as a whole but rather the
enhancem ent of their own persona l economic and social status. 1

The demand for a

given level of educatio n may therefor e be presumed to depend on the size of the
expected private return to that level of schoolin g. 2

The cross-co untry e·vidence

collecte d by Psacharo poulos (1973, p. 62) shows that private rates of return to
in
vestmen t in educatio n are very high; of three levels of educatio n for each of
eleven

3

less develope d countrie s for which data were availab le, only one is less than
.

ten percent and most are above twenty percent. 4

With few constra ints imposed bv

the necessi ty of financin g educatio nal investme nt by recourse to a capital market, 5
the very high private rates of return are readily translat ed into a very high
private demand for educatio n.
1

Even as ardent a supporte r of the mass demand for educatio n as Bereday (1969)
writes that "perhaps men should not want quite so much educatio n quite so badly,
since so many want it for the wrong reasons" but, ha continu es, "whatev er his
motives ,
an individ ual's desire for educatio n cannot be ignored ."
2
· This is not to imply that citizens actually compute such returns, but rather,
followin g Friedman (1953), they behave as if they do. Nor is it meant to imply
that
the size of the private return is the onlv determin ant of the demand for educatio
n.
The status, power, and prestige of being educated may be of equal or greater
impor
tance than monetary conside rations. We may view these non=pec uniary factors as
deter
mining a minimum value of the demand for educatio n and high private returns as
raising
demand above the base.
3

These are Puerto Rico, Mexico, Venezue la, Colombi a, Brazil, India, Philipp ines,
Thailan d, Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya.
4

rn most less develope d countrie s, schoolin g costs are heavily and often en
tirely subsidiz ed. So that the out-of-p ocket costs of schoolin g are small. However
,
the high private rates of return are probably better explaine d on the benefit
side.
Percenta ge wage differen tials between differen t skill levels in less develope
d
countri es, particu larly those in Africa, are much greater than in the "advance
d"
countri es.
5

This is another effect of large subsidie s to educatio n.
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A Model of Educational Demand
Let us consider a person's decision of whether or not to demand education.

pose for simplicity that we may distinguish between two groups of workers:

Sup

those

who have received at least a given level of education, and those who have received
less: we call these groups the"edurated"an d "uneducated" respectively.
suppose that there are two types of jobs:
person~

1

Let us also

jobs which can be filled only by educated

and jobs in which education may be a desirable but not essential qualifica-

tion; we call these "skilled" and "unskilled" jobs respectively.
types of unskilled jobs:

We consider two

jobs in the modern urban sector, which we will call "urban

unskilled" or simply "unskilled," and jobs in agriculture.

Full participation in

the labor force is assumed.
The decision to demand education depends on three sets of factors: the pecuniary
costs of education in relation to the individual's expectation of the financial bene
fits he will receive, the non-pecuniary (or psychic) costs to him of going to school
in relation to the non-pecuniary benefits of being an educated person, and the abil
ity of the individual (or his family) to incur the direct costs today in order to re
ceive future benefits.

his demand decision, he must have some notion of what future labor market conditions
will be.

Let us suppose that on some basis or other, which need not conform to ob

jective reality, he forms a subjective expectation of future events. If he is edu
cated and enters the skilled labor market, his assessment (denoted by superscript i)
1

This formulation is consistent with either (1) a neoclassical production
-function such that the marginal product of an uneducated worker in a skilled job
is always less than the wage he must be paid, or (2) a production function with
fixed coefficients.

~

-6of his expected income at each point in time is equal to the wage he expects to
receive in the skilled labor market if he is employed (W!(t)) multiplied hy his
assessment of the likelihood that he will be employed in the skilled market if he
Making allowance for discounting of future benefits (at rater)

is educated ( c/Jis(t)).

and dying or otherwise permanently dropping out of the labor force (at rate o), the
present discounted value of anticipated earnings for individual i if he is educated
and decides to enter the skilled labor market is

( 1)

VESi

r

=6

"' i (t)
.,,ES

WSi (t_)

e

-(r

+

o)t

dt-

We shall denote the present value of i's expected lifetime income if he is educated
and enters the labor market for unskilled jobs by vEt.

Similarly, vut and

vu!

are

respectivel y the present values of expected lifetime income if he is uneducated and
enters the unskilled (U) or agricdtura l (A) labor market.
i
i
VUU, and VUA

i

Expressions for VEU ,

may be constructed in a directly analogous manner to (1).
i

and VU

be respectivel y the present value of i's expected earnings if

he enters what he thinks is the highest-pay ing labor market open to him with alternative educational qualificatio ns.

and

i
VEU)

i
(VES

(2)

vi
E

= max

(3)

vi

= max <vuu ' VUA).

u

Then

i

i

For expositiona l ease, let us assume that it takes one period to acquire an
education and the direct out-of-pock et costs are some amount C.

The income foregone

during this period is the current unskilled wage (Wii) times the probability of being
i

employed in that period (c/>U).

The sum of these is the private cost of education.
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Since education takes one period and the benefits do not begin until the
following period, we must subtract from the earnings streams VEi and vi
U expected
earnings in the current period. We therefore have the present value of expected
.
i
incremental benefits of educat1.0n equal to (VE -

w8i

i
<1>

8

i

i i

) - (VU - WU¢U).

Taking the

difference between expected benefits and costs, we find that the expected present
value of investment in education for individual i (PVi) is
(4)

When deciding whether or not to demand education, in addition to financial
considerations, each person also considers the non-pecuniary costs to him of going

.

to school

1

and the non-pecuniary benefits of being an educated person.

If the sum

of the expected net pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits is positive, he will wish to
be educated.

This wish to be educated will be translated into effective demand for

education if the potential student is able to pay the direct costs of schooling.
However, if the sum of total net benefits is negative or if the student cannot pay
the school fees, education will not be demanded.

Let the present value of the exi

pected net non-pecuniary benefit for the i'th individual be denoted bv N and let
8

i

represent a dichotomous variable having the value one if the i'th family can ob-

tain financing for direct schooling costs and zero otherwise.

Then the individual

demand for education function is

Di= 0 otherwise,
and the aggregate demand for education is
(6)

1

D =

f

Di.

These non-pecuniary costs may he negative, i.e., the student may enjoy going
to school more than working.

-8We have said nothing so far about how subjective expectation s are formed.
Supposing that they b e a r ~ (not necessarily perfect) relation to labor market
reality, the simplest labor market assumptions consistent with this supposition are
that individuals regard today's wage rates and probabilitie s of becoming employed,
being fired, and dying as prevailinr, forever.

Interperson al differences in either

non-pecunia ry preferences for education or access to capital would cause the total
demand· for education to vary directly with the "objective" private present value of
educat'ional investment, i.e.,

(8)

D = f(PV), f 1

>

o, 1

The specific values underlying these expressions depend both on the size of the edu
cated labor force and on the allocation of the labor force between the various labor
markets. The specific labor market outcome depends on the behavior of educated workers
and their employers.

In the next section, four models of labor market behavior are

presented.
3.

Four ~odels of Labor Market Behavior
The literature concerning the labor market behavior of workers and employers

in the less developed countries with respect to education offers two general con
clusions.

First, educated people do as a rule accept lower-level jobs, presumably

when it is to their personal advantage to do so. 2
1

2

Second, employers in many countries

See quadrant (iii) in Figures 1-3 below.

Figures collected by the OECD (1969) for 53 countries show that while the
highly-educ ated are much more apt to be in the professiona l or managerial occupations
than persons with less education, a high degree of educational attainment is
neither necessary nor sufficient for entry into the most lucrative and prestigious
occupations .

-9appear to be using educational attainment as a criterion for hiring and selecting
the better-educated in preference to those with less education. 1

This suggests that

the bumping model (to be described below) may be a better general description of
labor market behavior in the less developed countries than the other models.

How-'

ever, since the available evidence in no way rules out the applicability of the other
models in other countries, we shall analyze them as well.
A.

The Bumping Model

In the bumping model, we assume that workers are income maximizers and enter
that labor force which offers the highest expected income. Furthermore, we suppose
that employers prefer to hire persons with more education at the prevailing constant
wage rate.

Preferential hiring may take place because the educated are (or are be

lieved to be) more productive than the uneducated, because employers prefer for noneconomic reasons to associate with the better-educated 1

2

or (some argue) because the

educated elite seek to legitimize their own positions at the top of the pecking
order by using an "objective" criterion like educ:·atbnal attainment to exclude others. 3
If it is profitable (in an expected value sense), we would expect that some sur
plus educated persons would move to the front of the queue for the unskilled _iobs
and be hired first at the unskilled wage rate,
a job.

11

bumping 11 a less-educated person from

Uneducated workers in unskilled jobs might be fired and replaced immediately,

or instead displaced over time as uneducated retirees are replaced by the educated.
For simplicity, we will assume zero frictional unemployment of educated persons in
the unskilled labor force.
1

Preferential hiring by educational level is documented in studies of India by
Blaug, Layard, and Woodhall (1969), of Turkey by Krueger (1971), and of Kenya by Singer
and Jolly (1973), in a symposium of manpower and education experts (see Skorov (1968)),
and in a report of the activities of the World Employment Programme of the ILO (see
Emmerij (1973)).
2
3

such a utility-maximizing model is considered in Johnson (1970).
See for instance Carnoy (1971).

-10Following our earlier distinction, the uneducated may choose between the urban
unskilled and agricultural labor forces, but they are excluded from the skilled
labor force due to lack of educational qualification.

In this and the following two

models, the uneducated are presumed always to choose between these alternatives in
order to maximize the expected value of their incomes.
In the bumping model, educated workers are hired first. This means that unedu
cated workers are left with whatever unskilled jobs the educated workers do not take.
Thus, education may be demanded in order to receive the advantage of a better relative
chance of being hired for an unskilled job.

It is of course conceivable that after

a point there may be so many educated persons that the uneducated are effectively
excluded from obtaining modern sector employment and the relative advantage is very
great indeed.
We shall now give a formal statement of the bumping model.

Let us first consider

the advantageousnes s of the various labor market options open to educated workers.
If there are fewer educated persons (LE) than skilled jobs (E 5 ), each educated per
son can expect to be fully-employed and earn the skilled wage

w5 •

Over their life

times, they would expect to earn
(10)

for large T.
Once the educated labor force exceeds the number of skilled jobs, the expected
wage becomes relevant. We suppose that each worker of a given educational type is
like any other worker of that type.
ratio of hires to job seekers.

Hence, the probability of finding a job is the

Unlike other multi-sector models, we assume that

workers in one labor market have a finite chance of securing a job in some other

-11labor market. The labor market for skilled jobs is assumed to operate like a
lottery in which each educated person in the skilled labor force has one ticket and
each educated person in the unskilled labor force has a j'th of a ticket. Similarly,
the labor market for urban unskilled jobs assumedly operates like a lottery in which
each person in the urban unskilled labor force has one ticket and each new entrant
in agriculture has an n'th of a ticket.
Let HS be skilled job hiring and JS be the number of skilled job-seeker equiva
lents, defined as follows.

JS is the total number of previously educated persons

in the skilled labor force (LES) plus the number of persons in the newly-educated
cohort who decide to enter the skilled labor force (CES) plus j times the number
of newly-educated persons who decide to enter the unskilled labor force (CEU) less the
number employed (ES):

The probability that an educated worker will move from unemployment into employment
is the ratio of hires to job seekers:
(12)

HS, the number of skilled jobs for which hiring is taking place, will be regarded
as a constant.

Let the probability that an employed skilled worker will become un

employed be a constant value 1/Js·

Then, taking the current values of PS and

w8

and

projecting them into the future, the worker's expectation of the probability that
he will be employed at some future time t has been shown by Johnson (1971) to be
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(13)

As a result of thic-: assumed expectation formation, the present value of lifetime
income expected by an educated person in the skilled labor force (VES) is
T
(14)

VES =

</>

) ws

S e

-(r + 6)t d

ws

t

=r + 6

PS
r + 6 + PS+ 1/JS

0

The present value of expected lifetime income for an educated person in the unskilled
labor force (VEU) may similarly be shown to be
(15)

=

r +

6

r + 6 +PS+ ijJS

provided the educated workers have not filled all the unskilled jobs.
Educated workers are assumed to allocate themselves between the two labor markets so that the equilibrium condition

is satisfied. This is not expressed as a strict equality, because there may not be
enough educated people to create a volume of unemployment in the skilled sector
sufficient to reduce VES to a level which strictly satisfies an equality condition.
In other words, for a small surplus of educated workers and a large skilled-unskilled
wage differential, the present value of expected income would he higher in the skilled
labor market than in the unskilled market even if all the surplus educated were to
be un.employed.
The labor markets for the uneducated may be formulated in a similar manner.
Uneducated persons may choose between the urban unskilled and agricultural labor
forces.

By assumption of the bumping model, educated persons are hired first for

unskille d jobs.

Therefo re, the number of unskille d jobs availabl e to uneduca ted

workers is the total hiring for unskille d jobs (H , which we take as constan t)
6
minus the number of persons in the newly-ed ucated cohort hired for unskille d jobs

The number of uneduca ted job-seek er equivale nts for unskille d jobs is

where n, the rural-ur ban relative job-sear ch paramet er, is the relative chance
of
finding an urban unskille d job for an uneduca ted person in the agricul tural labor
force as compared to· a person in the urban labor force.

Today's probabi lity of an

uneduca ted urban worker finding unskille d employm ent is therefor e
(18)

p

u

=

and

thepres ent value of expected lifetime income of an uneduca ted worker in the un
skilled urban sector is
(19)

r + o +Pu+ !/Ju

Similar ly, for an uneduca ted worker in agricult ure,
(20)

r + o +Pu+ !/Ju

nPU +

WA

r +

o

assuming that agricul tural jobs are availab le at wage WA.

(1. - nP u),

By the assumpt ion that

uneduca ted workers are-inco me maximiz ers, they will allocate themselv es between
the rural and urban labor markets so that the present values of expected income
in each are ·equal, i.e.,

-14In the less developed countries the modern sector is small relative to agriculture
and only a small fraction

of the population is educated.

It is therefore reason-

able to expect that there would always be enough uneducated persons to fill the
available unskilled jobs and (21) is always satisfied by a strict equality.
B.

The Labor Market Stratification Model
(1)

Labor Market Stratification on the Supply Side

In contrast to the bumping model just described, education in less developed
countries has sometimes been criticized for inculcating the few fortunate students
with the feeling that they are superior to the masses (see Myrdal (1968)).

Carried

to its logical conclusion, the implication is that the educated would ·always seek
high-level, high-status jobs and never seek or accept low-level jobs which would
"dirty their hands," even if they could earn more by doing so.

In such an economy,

any surplus educated persons would always be in the labor force for skilled jobs
and never consider employment in unskilled jobs.

In such circumstances, labor mar

kets are stratified by considerations of status and prestige.
(2)

Labor Market Stratification on the Demand Side

Suppose that educated persons are willing to work in unskilled jobs but em
ployers refuse to hire the educated, because they believe that the educated are
more apt to have low morale, resulting in lower productivity while on the job, greater
absenteeism, and more frequent quits. The labor market is also stratified in this
case, because it is fruitful for the educated to search only for the skilled jobs.
As in the previous case, any extra educated persons will be unemployed in the skilled
labor force and never underemployed in an unskilled job.
These two cases, although causally distinct, are analytically equivalent and
will be treated so subsequently.

-15\

Formall y, the labor market stratifi cation model is identica l with the bumping
model except that the educated workers do not allocate themselv es between the
differen t labor markets accordin g to (16) and LEU= ~= 0.
C.

The Pooling Model

The bumping model assumes that educated workers are favored by employe rs and
hired in preferen ce to the less educated for unskille d jobs. The labor market
stratifi cation model (demand side version) assumes just the opposite .
model embodies the third possibi lity:

The pooling

that educatio n is neither a'help nor a hin

drance in one's search for an unskille d job.

In the pooling model, we still regard

educatio n as necessar y for the skilled jobs,

We have, however , a large pool of

workers searchin g for the unskille d jobs, these workers being undiffe rentiate d by
educatio nal attainme nt.

In the pooling model, the unskille d jobs are divided be-

tween the educated and uneduca ted accordin g to some random process . 1
~quation s (10) - (14) continue to hold in the pooling model.
workers are no longer favored for unskille d jobs.

However , educated

Since they may be unemploy ed in

the unskille d labor force, they cannot expect to earn WU if they are unsucce ssful
in obtainin g a skilled job.

Rather, in each period, they would expect to earn W,.4>,.,
u

where q,U is the probabi lity of being employed in the unskille d sector.

u

By analogy

with (15) the present value of expected lifetime income of an educated worker who,
enters the unskille d labor force is now
(15')

1

hired.

u

EU

=

PS
r + o

r + o +PS+ ~s

·p
J s

+

(1-jPS).

The educated may have better contacts and therefor e better chances of being
However , we neglect this possibi lity.

-]6Unlike the bumping model, educated workers are not hired preferentially for un
skilled jobs, so (18) is replaced by
(18 I)
and J

u

p

u

=

is now the original unskilled pool plus the new entrants to the unskilled

labor force plus n times the number of new entrants to the agricultural labor force
minus those employed:

(17')
The present values of expected income of uneducated workers in the urban and rural
sectors are as before (19) and (20).

The other relations, including the equilibrium

conditions (16) and (21), are unchanged.
D.

The Bright Lights of the City Model

The bright lights of the city model embodies the view held by some

1

that the city

exerts an overwhelmingly strong pull on those who come in contact with it.

This

model postulates that as a consequence of the "bright lights of the city" no workers,
whether educated or uneducated, once in the city would ever return to the farm.
and

We
y_-,.; 1 1
".L.L..L'

if it is profitable to do so, bump the less educated out of unskilled jobs.
The bright lights of the city model is formally identical to the bumping model
except that we must add the additional constraint
(22)
1

~½JA _:: 0.

see for instance Little (1965).

-174.

Demand for Education Schedules Under Alternati ve Labor Market Condition s
In order to explain the persisten ce of a strong demand for education despite

educated unemploym ent, we wish to analyze the effects of a larger number of educated
workers in each of our labor market models.

This involves deriving demand for edu-

cation schedules as a function of the size of the educated labor force. 1

A general

expressio n for the change in the demand for education if the educated labor force is
enlarged may be found by different iating (8) and (9) with respect to LE:
(23)

Let us now see what these schedules look like in each case.
A.

The Case of Labor Market Stratifica tion 2

Consider first the labor market stratifica tion model. For a sufficien tly small
education al system, at the existing wage level, educated persons might be in short
supply.

In this range, each educated person can expect to be fully employed. This

does not change if the size of the educated labor force were to increase, Rrovided
a<t>s
there continues to be a shortage. Since <f>s = 1, it follows that-.-= 0 and

avE
aLE

--=

o.

aLE

Furthermo re, by choosing between the rural and urban unskilled labor forces

in order to maximize their expected incomes, uneducate d persons will reallocat e themselves so that the probabili ty of obtaining an unskilled job is unchanged in equili

av0

brium, which implies ~= 0.
E

Any other reallocat ion would cause there to be a

1

The decision by the education al authoriti es concernin g the size of the school
system might be made on the basis of a manpower plan, estimates of the social costs
and benefits of educating another person, or political or social considera tions.
Some observati ons in this regard may be found in a companion paper dealing with the
allocatio n of resources to education in less developed countries (Fields 1973)).
2

The order of presentat ion of the four models has been changed for expositio nal
purposes only.

_,q_
higher expected income in one labor market as compared to the other and would not
be an equilibrium since income-maxi mizing workers would migrate in order to erode
such temporary differentia l. Substitutin g the above into (23), we have
aPV
We therefore find that when there is a shortage of educated workers
= · - = O.
a LE
the present value of investing in education and the demand for education will remain
unchanged if another person is educated.
Once the educational system has produced more than enough educated workers
to fill all the skilled jobs for which hiring is taking place, each educated person
must expect to be unemployed part of the time.

The greater the number of educated

persons, the more skilled job seekers there are, so the lower will be the probability
of finding a skilled job, and in turn the lower the present value of becoming educated.
elf)

Hence, aLE < O,

and our model implies that when there is a surplus of educated

workers in the case of labor market stratificati on the demand for education will de
cline as the educated labor force increases.
These results are illustrated graphically in Figure 1. Zones I and It corres
pond respectivel y to shortages and surpluses of educated workers.

In quadrant (i),

we see that the present value (PV) is constant while there is a shortage of educated
workers and declines monotonical ly thereafter.

Taking an illustrativ e D = f(PV)

function in quadrant (iii), we derive the demand for education as a function of the
educated labor force,shown as D = g(LE) in quadrant (iv). We.see that if labor mar
kets are stratified, after a point the larger the size of the educated surplus in
a country all other things equal the smaller the demand for education.
B.

The Case of Bumping

In the bumping case, there are four distinct zones depending on the number of
educated workers relative to the number of jobs. For ease of reference, these four
zones are summarized in Table 1.
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r
(Note:

Figure 1.
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Roman numerals indicate the beginnin g of the respecti ve zones)

The Demand for Educatio n in the Case of Labor Market Stratifi cation
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Table 1
Labor Market Zones in the Bumping Model

r.

Zone

Fewer educated workers than skilled jobs

Zone II.

Surplus of educated workers, all enter skilled labor force
and are unemployed

Zone I!T.

Bumping occurs, i.e., some educated workers enter the un
skilled labor force and are hired preferentially

Zone IV.

All modern sector job vacancies are filled by educated persons

The first zone is defined by a shortage of educated workers relative to skilled
jobs. Since the skilled wage is higher than the unskilled wage, all educated workers
would enter the labor force for skilled jobs and be fully employed.
A second zone begins when there first occurs a surplus of educated persons rela
tive to skilled job hiring.

For some small surplus of educated workers, there would

be sufficiently little educated unemployment and a sufficiently high probability
of being employed that the present value of expected lifetime income of an educated
worker

in the skilled labor force (VES) would continue to be greater than the pre

sent value of expected income of an educated worker in the unskilled labor force
(VEU).

This being the case, income-maximizing employees would choose partial em

ployment/partial unemployment in the skilled labor force in preference to full-time
employment at a lower wage in the unskilled sector.
Zones I and I ! in the lrnmping model are formally equivalent to the labor market
stratification case just described.

Therefore, the pattern of the demand for educa

tion as a function of the educated labor force (constant over Zone I and falling
over Zone II) also holds in the bumping model.
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After some point, there would be sufficient unemployment that VES would be
driven down and equal to VEu·

This point marks the beginning of a third zone, in

which it would be profitable for educated workers to bump uneducated workers out of
unskilled jobs.

Once Zone III begins and employment in the unskilled labor force

becomes profitable, the demand for education no longer declines monotonically with
the number of educated persons.

Rather, we find that

When bumping is taking place, educated and uneducated workers, each choosin~
between the various labor market alternatives open to them in order to maximize
their expected incomes, will allocate themselves so that the private rate of
return and the demand for education will remain constant as more persons are
educated and the educated labor force gets larger.
When bumping is taking place, educated workers are choosing between the skilled
and unskilled labor markets so that the present values of expected lifetime income
in each (VES and VEU) are equal.

If the markets are in such an equilibrium and

another person is educated, the equilibrium will initially be disturbed. If the
additional educated worker enters the skilled labor market, his presence causes the
probability of finding a skilled job to fall and thereby lowers the present value of
expected income of an educated worker in the skilled labor market below what he could
earn in the unskilled labor market.

This would induce other educated workers to

leave the skilled market and enter the unskilled market, which raises the probability
of finding a skilled job.

Equilibrium is restored when there has been suffictent

shifting to raise the probability of employment in a skilled.job (~S) and the ex
pected skilled income (VES) back up to their original levels. The same adjustment
process and resultant equilibrium follow if the additional educated workers were to
have initially entered the unskilled labor force.
Turning now to the markets for unskilled workers, the presence of additional
educated persons in the unskilled labor market reduces the number of jobs available

to uneducated workers and thereby lowers their probability of employment.

The urban

unskilled labor market is now less attractive than agriculture and income-maximizing
uneducated workers find it to their advantage to return to or remain on the farm. As
theydo this, the probability of an uneducated worker finding an urban unskilled job
increases and v
rises relative to VUA'
00

After sufficient out-migration of unskilled

workers from the urban sector, the unskilled labor markets will equilibrate with the
probability of obtaining an urban unskilled job and the present value of expected
income of an ureducated person unchanged from their original levels.
We have therefore shown that when bumping is occurring and another person is
educated, the reallocation of the labor force between the various labor markets will
leave unchanged the present values of expected incomes for workers in each labor
market.

Hence the present value of investing in education and the demand for educa

tion will also remain the same in the zone where bumping is taking place.
Bumping could continue until educated workers are hired to fill all unskilled
job vacancies. After that point, a final zone would begin with educated workers com
peting amongst themselves for both skilled and unskilled jobs and uneducated workers
effectively excluded from breaking into tle modern sector.

1

If society were to decide

..
.
,,.
.
to educate another person this would add to cne numoer or seeKers

,-

'I

•

..

..

..

•

'I

-

ror SK1LLeo J~u~,

which would lower the probability of an educated worker finding a skilled job and
lower the expected income if one is educated.

The expected income of an uneducated

worker, which is the lifetime agricultural wage, would remain the same.

Therefore,

the present value of investing in education and the demand for education would de
cline the larger the educated surplus in Zone

tV.

The demand for education for alternative supplies of educated labor in the case
of bumping is summarized in Figure 2.

1

nue to seniority prov1s1ons and other reasons for job fixity, uneducated workers
already employed in unskilled jqbs ar~ (except for normal turnover) retained,
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Figure 2.

The Demand for Educatio n in the Cases of Bumping and Pooling.

C.

The Case of Poolin g

In the poolin g model , there are four distin ct zones .
The first two are ident i
cal with those of the bumpi ng model .

After there is suffi cient unemp loyme nt to re

duce VES to VEU' there begin s a third zone in which
some surplu s educa ted worke rs
enter the pool of worke rs for unski lled jobs but unlike
the bumpi ng model are not
hired prefe renti ally. After a point , there begin s a
fourth zone in which unedu cated
worke rs do not find it profi table to enter the urban
unski lled labor force and that
marke t conta ins only educa ted worke rs. These zones
are summ arized in Table 2.
/

Table 2
Labor Marke t Zones in the Poolin g Model

Zone I.

Fewer educa ted worke rs than skille d jobs

Zone lI.

Surpl us of educa ted worke rs, all enter skille d labor
force
and are unemp loyed

Zone ITT.

Educa tedcW orkers enter the unski lled labor force but
are not
hired prefe renti ally

Zone IV.

Unedu cated worke rs have vacat ed the unski lled labor
force

We shall show that the patte rn of the demand for educa
tion as a funct ion of the
educa ted labor force shown in Figur e 2 also holds in
the pool'i ng model . In the
pooli ng model , the alloc ation of the labor force as
anoth er perso n is educa ted in Zones
I and II is the same as in the bumpi ng model since the two
are analy ticall y equiv a
lent. Thus, the demand for educa tion is const ant in
Zone I and falls in Zone II.
There is one impor tant differ ence betwe en the bumpi
ng and pooli ng mode ls, howev er,
and that is that Zone III in the pooli ng model begin
s later . This is easil y under stood
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economic ally.

In the bumping model, an educated worker who chooses to enter the

unskilled labor force

earns the unskilled wage WU and is fully-emp loyed.

In the

pooling model, he is only partially employed, so the present value of his expected
income is lower.

Con~eque ntly, the opportuni ty cost of being unemploye d in the

skilled labor force when there is pooling is less than when there is bumping. Workers
would therefore be expected to tolerate more unemploym ent in the pooling case than
in the bumping case.
Once Zone III is reached and educated workers begin to enter the unskilled labor
force, the pooling model predicts a pattern which the reader may find surprisin g: al
though educated and uneducate d workers in the urban unskilled labor market are paid
the same wage and have the same probabil ities of employme nt, if another person is
educated, educated workers would replace uneducate d ones in the unskilled urban labor
market.

Viewed in terms of job search opportun ities, this makes good economic sense.

By being in the cities, educated workers

have a better chance of obtaining high

paying skilled employmen t than if they were on the farm. The movement of uneducate d
workers between the urban unskilled and agricultu ral labor markets assures that the
present values of expected income are equal.

This means that educated workers can

earn the same wage in the city as on the farm and yet while in the city have a better
chance at a skilled job. Thus, we would expe~t-th at educated workers would settle in
the cities.

As they do, this adds to the pool of seekers for unskilled jobs, lower

ing the probabili ty of finding one, reducing the present value of expected income in
the city below the present value in agricultu re, and driving uneducate d workers (who
havethe least to lose) back to the farm until the present values arec:gain equal.
the demand for education would be constant for alternati ve education al supplies in
Zone III.

Thus,
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Note that if educate d workers did not have this improve d job search
opportu n
ity, the only change when anothe r person is educate d would be that there
would be
one more person in the· urban unskill ed labor market with educati on rather
than
withou t, but there would be no migrati on into (or back to) agricu lture.
Finally , in Zone IV, VUU
sector .

<

VUA and uneduc ated worker s have vacated the urban

Except for startin g with a larger educate d surplu s, this zone is formall
y

equiva lent to Zone IV in the bumping model and all previou s results
obtain.
D. The Bright Lights of the City Case 1
The bright lights of the city model is a varian t of the bumping model.

Rather

than behavin g in a pure expecte d income- maximi zing ~anner , worker s are
assumed to
maximi ze income subjec t to the behavi oral constra int that no one living
in the
city would move back to the farm even if he could expect to earn more
there.
This behavi oral limitat ion has no effect on the outcom es in Zones I
and If,
since there is migrat ion of both educate d and uneduc ated worker s into
the cities.
Howeve r, once bumping begins , the bumping model require s there to be
migrati on back
to the rural areas in order to preserv e equilib rium between the labor
markets for
uneduc ated worker s.

Since this is not allowed in the bright lights of the city model,

the uneduc ated labor market s would be in disequ ilibrium .

This raises an intrigu ing

possib ility:
When bumping is taking place in the bright lights of the city model,
the
labor force alloca tion will be such that the private rate of return
and the
demand for educati on would be expecte d to increas e if more persons are
educate d
and the educate d labor force gets larger.

1

This model was first sugges ted in my "Priva te and Social Returns to
Educat ion
in Labour Surplus Econom jes," Institu te for Develop ment Studie s, Univer
sity of
Nairob i, Discus sion Paper No. 104, April, 1971, a revised version of
which is pub
lished as Fields (1972a ). In neithe r version , howeve r, was the prohib
ition agains t
out-mi gration from urban areas made explic it.

-27Why might this be expected?

If another person is educated, the large number of

educated workers will choose between the skilled and unskilled labor forces so as
to leave the present value of expected incomes in the two markets equal to one another
and unchanged from their original levels. This requires that at least 1 one educated
worker enter the urban unskilled labor force. There is now one less urban unskilled
job available for the remaining uneducated workers. As a result, the probability of
an uneducated worker obtaining an urban unskilled job falls) and this lowers the
expected urban irtcome for an uneducated worker below what he could earn in agricul
ture.

However, by assumption of the bright lights of the city model uneducated

workers would not leave the city, so the disequilibrium is not eroded as in the
bumping model.
fore falls.

The present value of expected income of an uneducated worker there

The combined effect of a constant expected income for the educated

worker and a lower expected income for the uneducated is, of course, to raise the
present value and hence the demand for education.
Finally, Zone lV begins when there is such a large surplus of educated workers
that uneducated workers have no chance of being hired for unskilled jobs and there
will be unemployment of the educated in both the skilled and the unskilled labor
markets~ If another person is

0 ~ 11 r~~~~,

the more educated persons there are seeking

a given number of jobs and so the lower the probability of any given educated worker
being employed. This lowers the expected value of being eP.ucated, which in turn
lowers the demand for education.
The demand for education schedule in the bright lights of the city case is shown
graphically in Figure 3.

For ease of comparison, the demand for education schedules

derived for the four labor market models are shown together in Figure 4.

1

There will be only one if educated workers employed in unskilled jobs have
no chance of obtaining a skilled job, more than one otherwise.
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The Demand for Education in the Bright Lights of the City Model
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5.

Conclu ding Remarks
be
We have describ ed severa l alterna tive accoun ts of possib le labor market

havior by worker s and employ ers in less develop ed countr ies.

Our analys is, as

the persist ence
summar ized in Figures 1 - 4, sugges ts three possib le explan ations for
t of substa ntial
of a high demand for educati on despite unemplo yment and underem ploymen
number s of educate d persons .
of the city
One possib ility is that the scenar io describ ed by the bright lights
a range during which the demand rises as the size of the educate d labor

model

circum stances
force is increas ed -- essent ially describ es the particu lar labor market
countr ies today.
and particu lar stages of develop ment of at least some less develop ed

been establi shed
Howeve r, the validit y of the bright lights of the city model has not
. 1
by rural-u rban migrati on studies to date.
ely inelas
A second possib ility is that the demand for educati on may be relativ
is demande d pri
tic with respec t to private returns . This may be because educati on
confers and not
marily for the consum ption or non-pe cuniary investm ent benefi ts it
for those financ ial returns which are measure d by presen t values .

Altern atively , it

is obviou sly a
may be becaus e the presen t value is already so large that educati on
The availab le
sound person al financ ial investm ent and virtua lly everyon e wants it.
2
evidenc e is fully consis tent with the latter positio n.
for educati on
A third possib le explan ation for the persist ence of a high demand
ely inelas tic with
is that the presen t value of investi ng in educati on may be relativ
respec t to the supply of educate d worker s.

To my knowle dge, this hypoth esis has

not as yet been subject ed to empiri cal test.
of the
rhis is the conclu sion reached by Frank (1971) after a thoroug h review
rural-u rban migrat ion literat ure.
1

2

See Psacha ropoulo s (1973) and Section 1.

--31It should be remarked that these three possibiliites are in no way mutually
exclusive.

Rather, they reinforce each other

and,to the extent each is correct,

they provide sound economic reasons for expecting the private demand for education
to remain strong despite the existence of a large and growing surplus of educated
workers in the labor market. This prediction challenges the view that the sustained
demand for education results from over-optimistic labor market expectations compared
to reality.
This conclusion suggests an important policy implication for educational
planning. Suppose that in light of a ~urplus of highly-educated workers and upon the
advice of experts in the area, the government of a less developed countty were to
decide to reallocate its educationsl budget away from secondary and higher education
and toward primary education.

In the short run, the government could simply adjust

supply in the desired manner. However, in the absence of complementary measures to
reduce the demand for secondary and higher education, the people would continue to
push for more high-level educational facilities.

Not only might the political

pressures on officials tend to subvert the reallocation program but the people might
also (as they did in Kenya)join together to construct their own private or community
'
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Thus, in order for a governmental program to reallocate educational resources to
be effective, steps must be taken to reduce the private present value of investing
in education.
We have seen that the private returns to investing in education deoend on the
earnings and employment probabilities of educated workers relative to the uneducated
and the private costs of acquiring an education. This points to the areas where
leverage might be exerted.

One possible means of reducing the size of the private
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present value is to introduce an incomes policy, either by narrowing nominal skilled
unskilled wage differentials or by making the tax structure more progressive. Another
whether preferential hiring by educational level

is to cause employers to question
is really necessary.

1

Yet another is to charge students a larger share or perhaps

even the full cost of their schooling;

students who receive higher education could

.

be charged full costs, to be repaid over their working lives.

2

None of the proposed changes would be easy to implement, given the political
power of the groups whose interests would be adversely affected. But when one con
siders the deleterious effect on the economic and social development of a country
of continuing to spend scarce public funds to produce a well-educated and unemployed
few while many others could be made literate, there is cause for concern.

1

on this point, see Blaug, Layard, and Woodhall (1969).

2Alternative

loan schemes are considered in detail in Fields (1972b).
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